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The coronavirus 2019–2020 pandemic (COVID-19) poses un-
precedented challenges for governments and societies around the 
world (1). Nonpharmaceutical interventions have proven to be 
critical for delaying and containing the COVID-19 pandemic (2–6). 
These include testing and tracing, bans on large gatherings, non-
essential business and school and university closures, international 
and domestic mobility restrictions and physical isolation, and total 
lockdowns of regions and countries. Decision-making and eval-
uation or such interventions during all stages of the pandemic life 
cycle require specific, reliable, and timely data not only about in-
fections but also about human behavior, especially mobility and 
physical copresence. We argue that mobile phone data, when used 
properly and carefully, represents a critical arsenal of tools for sup-
porting public health actions across early-, middle-, and late-stage 
phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Seminal work on human mobility has shown that aggregate and 
(pseudo-)anonymized mobile phone data can assist the modeling of 
the geographical spread of epidemics (7–11). Thus, researchers and 
governments have started to collaborate with private companies, 
most notably mobile network operators and location intelligence 
companies, to estimate the effectiveness of control measures in a 
number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, Chile, China, 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United 
States (12–21).
There is, however, little coordination or information exchange 
between these national or even regional initiatives (22). Although 
ad hoc mechanisms leveraging mobile phone data can be effectively 
(but not easily) developed at the local or national level, regional or 
even global collaborations seem to be much more difficult given the 
number of actors, the range of interests and priorities, the variety of 
legislations concerned, and the need to protect civil liberties. The 
global scale and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the 
need for a more harmonized or coordinated approach.
In the following sections, we outline the ways in which different 
types of mobile phone data can help to better target and design 
measures to contain and slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
We identify the key reasons why this is not happening on a much 
broader scale, and we give recommendations on how to make 
mobile phone data work against the virus.
HOW CAN MOBILE PHONE DATA HELP TO TACKLE 
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?
Passively generated mobile phone data have emerged as a potentially 
valuable data source to infer human mobility and social interactions. 
Call detail records (CDRs) are arguably the most researched type of 
mobile data in this context. CDRs are collected by mobile operators 
for billing purposes. Each record contains information about the 
time and the cell tower that the phone was connected to when the 
interaction took place. CDRs are event-driven records: In other words, 
the record only exists if the phone is actively in use. Additional in-
formation includes “sightings data” obtained when a phone is seen 
on a network. There are, however, other types of mobile phone data 
used to study human mobility behaviors and interactions. X data 
records or network probes, can be thought as metadata about the 
phone’s data channel, capturing background actions of apps and the 
network. Routine information including highly accurate location 
data is also collected through mobile phone applications (apps) at 
a large scale by location intelligence companies (23) or by ad hoc 
apps (24, 25). In addition, proximity between mobile phone users 
can be detected via Bluetooth functionality on smartphones. Each 
of these data types requires different processing frameworks and 
raise complex ethical and political concerns that are discussed in 
this paper.
First, we explore the value and contribution of mobile phone data 
in analytical efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic. Government 
and public health authorities broadly raise questions in at least four 
critical areas of inquiries for which the use of mobile phone data 
is relevant. First, situational awareness questions seek to develop 
an understanding of the dynamic environment of the pandemic. 
Mobile phone data can provide access to previously unavailable 
population estimates and mobility information to enable stake-
holders across sectors better understand COVID-19 trends and 
geographic distribution. Second, cause-and-effect questions seek 
to help identify the key mechanisms and consequences of imple-
menting different measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. 
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They aim to establish which variables make a difference for a prob-
lem and whether further issues might be caused. Third, predictive 
analysis seeks to identify the likelihood of future outcomes and could, 
for example, leverage real-time population counts and mobility data 
to enable predictive capabilities and allow stakeholders to assess 
future risks, needs, and opportunities. Finally, impact assessments 
aim to determine which, whether, and how various interventions 
affect the spread of COVID-19 and require data to identify the 
obstacles hampering the achievement of certain objectives or the 
success of particular interventions. Table 1 provides specific examples 
of questions by areas of inquiry. The relevance and specific ques-
tions raised as part of these areas of inquiry differ at various stages 
of the outbreak, but mobile phone data provide value throughout 
the epidemiological cycle, shown in Fig. 1. 
In the early recognition and initiation phase of the pandemic, 
responders focus on situational analysis and the fast detection of in-
fected cases and their contacts. Research has shown that quarantine 
measures of infected individuals and their family members, combined 
with surveillance and standard testing procedures, are effective as 
control measures in the early stages of the pandemic (26). Individual 
mobility and contact (close proximity) data offer information about 
infected individuals, their locations, and social network. Contact 
(close proximity) data can be collected through mobile apps (24, 27), 
interviews, or surveys (28).
During the acceleration phase, when community transmission 
reaches exponential levels, the focus is on interventions for contain-
ment, which typically involve social contact and mobility restrictions. 
At this stage, aggregated mobile phone data are valuable to assess 
the efficacy of implemented policies through the monitoring of 
mobility between and within affected municipalities. Mobility in-
formation also contributes to the building of more accurate epide-
miological models that can explain and anticipate the spread of 
the disease, as shown for H1N1 flu outbreaks (29). These models, in 
turn, can inform the mobilization of resources (e.g., respirators and 
intensive care units).
Last, during the deceleration and preparation phases, as the peak of 
infections is reached, restrictions will likely be lifted (30). Continued 
situational monitoring will be important as the COVID-19 pandemic 
is expected to come in waves (4, 31). Near real-time data on mobility 
and hotspots will be important to understand how lifting and re-
establishing various measures translate into behavior, especially to 
find the optimal combination of measures at the right time (e.g., 
general mobility restrictions, school closures, and banning of large 
gatherings), and to balance these restrictions with aspects of eco-
nomic vitality. After the pandemic has subsided, mobile data will be 
helpful for post hoc analysis of the impact of different interventions 
on the progression of the disease and cost-benefit analysis of mobility 
restrictions. During this phase, digital contact-tracing technologies 
might be deployed, such as the Korean smartphone app Corona 100m 
(32) and the Singaporean smartphone app TraceTogether (33), that 
aim at minimizing the spread of a disease as mobility restrictions 
are lifted. Along this line, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and collaborators are working on Private Kit: Safe 
Paths (25), an open-source and privacy-first contact-tracing tech-
nology that provides individuals with information on their proximity 
with diagnosed COVID-19 carriers, using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and Bluetooth data. Similarly, several European universities, 
research centers, and companies have joined forces around PEPP-PT 
[Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (34)], a col-
laboration on privacy-preserving, General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)–compliant contact tracing. Along this effort, a consortium 
of research institutions, led by the École Polytechnique Fédérale de 
Lausanne (EPFL), has developed an open Decentralized Privacy- 
Preserving Proximity Tracing protocol and implementation using 
Bluetooth low-energy functionality on smartphones, ensuring that 
personal data and computation stay entirely on an individuals’ phones 
(35). Recently, Apple and Google have released a joint announcement 
(36) describing their system to support Bluetooth-based privacy- 
preserving proximity tracing across iOS and Android smartphones. 
As a part of the European Commission recommendation of a co-
ordinated approach to support the gradual lifting of lockdown 
measures (37), European Union (EU) member states, supported 
by the Commission, have developed a toolbox for the develop-
ment and usage of contact tracing apps, fully compliant with EU 
rules (38).
Table 1. Examples of questions by areas of inquiry.  
Situational awareness Cause and effect
● What are the most common 
mobility flows within and 
between COVID-19–affected 
cities and regions?
● What are variables that 
determine the success of social 
distancing approaches?
● Which areas are spreading the 
epidemics acting as origin nodes 
in a mobility network and thus 
could be placed under mobility 
restrictions?
● How do local mobility patterns 
affect the burden on the 
medical system?
● Are people continuing to travel 
or congregate after social 
distancing and travel restrictions 
were put into place?
● Are business’ social distancing 
recommendations resulting in 
more workers working from 
home?
● Are there hotspots at higher risk 
of contamination (due to a 
higher level of mobility and 
higher concentration of 
population)?
● In what sectors are people 
working most from home?
● What are the key entry points, 
locations, and movements of 
roamers or tourists?
● What are the social and 




● How are certain human mobility 
patterns likely to affect the 
spread of the coronavirus? And 
what is the likely spread of 
COVID-19, based on existing 
disease models and up-to-date 
mobility data?
● How have travel restrictions 
affected human mobility 
behavior and likely disease 
transmission?
● What are the likely effects of 
mobility restrictions on 
children’s education outcomes?
● What is the potential of various 
restriction measures to avert 
infection cases and save lives?
● What are likely to be the 
economic consequences of 
restricted mobility for 
businesses?
● What is the effect of mandatory 
social distancing measures, 
including closure of schools?
● How has the dissemination of 
public safety information and 
voluntary guidance affected 
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SPECIFIC METRICS FOR DATA-SUPPORTED DECISIONS
Researchers and practitioners have developed a variety of aggregated 
metrics using mobile phone data that can help fill gaps in informa-
tion needed to respond to COVID-19 and address uncertainties 
regarding mobility and behaviors. Origin-destination (OD) matrices 
are especially useful in the first epidemiological phases, where the 
focus is to assess the mobility of the population. The number of 
people moving between two different areas daily can be computed 
from the mobile network data, and it can be considered a proxy of 
human mobility. The geographic areas of interest might be zip codes, 
municipalities, provinces, or even regions. These mobility flows are 
compared to those during a reference period to assess the reduction 
in mobility due to nonpharmaceutical interventions. In particular, 
they are useful to monitor the impact of different social and mobility 
contention measures and to identify regions where the measures 
might not be effective or followed by the population. Moreover, 
these flows can inform spatially explicit disease transmission models 
to evaluate the potential benefit of such reductions.
Dwell estimations and hotspots are estimates of particularly high 
concentration of people in an area, which can be favorable to the 
transmission of the virus. These metrics are typically constructed 
within a municipality by dividing the city into grids or neighborhoods 
(39). The estimated number of people in each geographical unit can 
be computed with different time granularities (e.g., 15 min, 60 min, 
and 24 hours).
Contact matrices estimate the number and intensity of the face-
to-face interactions people have in a day. They are typically computed 
by age groups. These matrices have been shown to be extremely useful 
to assess and determine the decrease of the reproduction number of 
the virus (6). However, it is still challenging to estimate face-to-face 
interactions from colocation and mobility data (40). Contact-tracing 
apps can then be used to identify close contacts of those infected 
with the virus.
Amount of time spent at home, at work, or other locations are 
estimates of the individual percentage of time spent at home/work/
other locations (e.g., public parks, malls, and shops), which can be 
useful to assess the local compliance with countermeasures adopted 
by governments. The home and work locations need to be computed 
in a period of time before the deployment of mobility restrictions 
measures. The percentage of time spent in each location needs to be 
computed for people who do not move during this time. Variations 
of the time spent on different locations are generally computed 
on an individual basis and then spatially aggregated at a zip code, 
municipality, city, or region level.
Although there is still little information about the age-specific 
susceptibility to COVID-19 infection, it is clear that age is an im-
portant risk factor for COVID-19 severity. We highlight, therefore, 
the importance of estimating the metrics mentioned above by age 
groups (6). Figure 2 shows an example of such metrics.
WHY IS THE USE OF MOBILE PHONE DATA NOT WIDESPREAD, 
OR A STANDARD, IN TACKLING EPIDEMICS?
The use of mobile phone data for tackling the COVID-19 pandemic 
has gained attention but remains relatively scarce. Although local 
alliances have been formed, internationally concerted action is miss-
ing, both in terms of coordination and information exchange (22). 
In part, this is the result of a failure to institutionalize past experi-
ences. During the 2014–2016 Ebola virus outbreak, several pilot or 
one-off activities were initiated. However, there was no transition to 
“business as usual” in terms of standardized procedures to leverage 
mobile phone data or establish mechanisms for “data readiness” in 
the country contexts (41, 42). Technology has evolved with various 
platforms offering enhanced and secured access and analysis of 
mobile data, including for humanitarian and development use cases 
[e.g.,  Open Algorithms for Better Decisions Project (43) and Flowkit (44)]. 
Furthermore, high-level meetings have been held [e.g., the European 
Commission’s business-to- government (B2G) data sharing high- 
level expert group], data analysis and sharing initiatives have shown 
promising results, yet the use of metrics and insights derived from 
mobile phone data by governments and local authorities is still minimal 
today (43). Several factors likely explain this “implementation” gap.
First, governments and public authorities frequently are unaware 
and/or lack a “digital mindset” and capacity needed for both for 
processing information that often is complex and requires multi-
disciplinary expertise (e.g., mixing location and health data and 
specialized modeling) and for establishing the necessary inter-
disciplinary teams and collaborations. Many government units 
are understaffed and sometimes also lack technological equipment. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, most authorities are overwhelmed 
by the multiplicity and simultaneity of requests; as they have never 
been confronted with such a crisis, there are few predefined proce-
dures and guides, so targeted and preventive action is quickly aban-
doned for mass actions. These problems are exacerbated at local 
levels of governments (e.g., towns and counties), which are precisely 
the authorities doing the frontline work in most situations. In addi-
tion, many public authorities and decision-makers are not aware of the 
value that mobile phone data would provide for decision-making 
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and are often used to make decisions without knowing the full facts 
and under conditions of uncertainty.
Second, despite substantial efforts, access to data remains a chal-
lenge. Most companies, including mobile network operators, tend 
to be very reluctant to make data available—even aggregated and 
anonymized—to researchers and/or governments. Apart from data 
protection issues, such data are also seen and used as commercial 
assets, thus limiting the potential use for humanitarian goals if there 
are no sustainable models to support operational systems. One should 
also be aware that not all mobile network operators in the world are 
equal in terms of data maturity. Some are actively sharing data as a 
business, while others have hardly started to collect and use data.
Third, the use of mobile phone data raises legitimate public con-
cerns about privacy, data protection, and civil liberties. Governments 
in China, South Korea, Israel, and elsewhere have openly accessed 
and used personal smartphone app data for tracking individual move-
ments and notifying individuals. However, in other regions, such as 
in Europe, both national and regional legal regulations limit such 
use (especially the EU law on data protection and privacy known as 
the GDPR). Furthermore, around the world, public opinion surveys, 
social media, and a broad range of civil society actors including 
consumer groups and human rights organizations have raised legit-
imate concerns around the ethics, potential loss of privacy, and 
long-term impact on civil liberties resulting from the use of individual 
mobile data to monitor COVID-19. Control of the pandemic requires 
control of people—including their mobility and other behaviors. A 
key concern is that the pandemic is used to create and legitimize 
surveillance tools used by government and technology companies 
that are likely to persist beyond the emergency. Such tools and en-
hanced access to data may be used for purposes such as law enforce-
ment by the government or hypertargeting by the private sector. 
Such an increase in government and industry power and the absence 
of checks and balance is harmful in any democratic state. The con-
sequences may be even more devastating in less democratic states 
that routinely target and oppress minorities, vulnerable groups, and 
other populations of concern.
Fourth, researchers and technologists frequently fail to articulate 
their findings in clear, actionable terms that respond to practical 
political and technical questions. Researchers and domain experts 
tend to define the scope and direction of analytical problems from 
their perspective and not necessarily from the perspective of govern-
ments’ needs. Critical decisions have to be taken, while key results 
are often published in scientific journals and in jargon that are 
not easily accessible to outsiders, including government workers and 
policy makers.
Last, there is little political will and resources invested to support 
preparedness for immediate and rapid action. On country levels, there 
are too few latent and standing mixed teams, composed of (i) represent-
atives of governments and public authorities, (ii) mobile network 
operators and technology companies, and (iii) different topic experts 
(virologists, epidemiologists, and data analysts); and there are no 
procedures and protocols predefined. None of these challenges are 
insurmountable, but they require a clear call for action.
A CALL TO ACTION TO FIGHT COVID-19
To effectively build the best, most up-to-date, relevant, and action-
able knowledge, we call on governments, mobile network operators, 
and technology companies (e.g. Google, Facebook, and Apple), and 
researchers to form mixed teams. Governments should be aware of 
the value of information and knowledge that can be derived from 
mobile phone data analysis, especially for monitoring the necessary 
measures to contain the pandemic. They should enable and leverage 
the fair and responsible provision and use of aggregated and anonymized 
data for this purpose. Mobile network operators and technology com-
panies with widespread adoption of their products (e.g. Facebook, 
Google, and Apple) should take their social responsibility and the 
vital role that they can play in tackling the pandemic. They should 
reach out to governments and the research community. Researchers 
and domain experts (e.g. virologists, epidemiologists, demographers, 
data scientists, computer scientists, and computational social scientists) 
should acknowledge the value of interdisciplinary teams and context 
specificities and sensitivities. Impact would be maximized if govern-
ments and public authorities are included early on and throughout 
their efforts to identify the most relevant questions and knowledge 
needs. Creating multidisciplinary interinstitutional teams is of par-
amount importance, as recently shown successfully in Belgium and 
the Valencian region of Spain (45). Four key principles should guide 
the implementation of such mixed teams to improve their effective-
ness, namely (i) the early inclusion of governments, (ii) the liaising 
with data protection authorities early on, (iii) international exchange, 
and (iv) preparation for all stages of the pandemic.
B C 
D 
Fig. 2. Extraction of aggregated metrics from mobile phone data. (A) Raw data representing 1-day mobility of two users. In this example, the area B is a hotspot, as it 
shows a high concentration of people. (B) OD matrix of five different areas, counting the number of trips from one area (rows) to another area (columns). (C) Contact 
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Relevant government and public authorities should be involved 
early, and researchers need to build upon their knowledge systems 
and need for information. One key challenge is to make insights 
actionable—how can findings such as propagation maps lastly be 
used (e.g., for setting quarantine zones, informing local governments, 
and targeting communication). At the same time, expectations must 
be realistic: Decisions on measures should be based on facts but are, 
in the end, political decisions. Many insights derived from mobile 
phone data analytics do not have practical implications—such 
analysis and the related data collection should be discouraged until 
proven necessary.
We also suggest such efforts be transparent and involve data 
protection authorities and civil liberties advocates early on and have 
quick iteration cycles with them. For example, policy makers should 
consider the creation of an ethics and privacy advisory committee 
to oversee and provide feedback on projects. This ensures that pri-
vacy is maintained and raises potential user acceptance. Aggregated 
mobile phone data can be used in line even with the strict European 
regulations (GDPR). Earlier initiatives have established principles 
and methods for sharing data or indicators without endangering 
personal information and build privacy-preserving solutions that 
use only incentives to manage behavior (46–48). The early inclusion 
of the data protection authority in Belgium has led to the publishing 
of a statement by the European Data Protection Board on how to 
process mobile phone data in the fight against COVID-19 (49). 
Even while acknowledging the value of mobile phone data, the 
urgency of the situation should not lead to losses of data privacy 
and other civil liberties that might become permanent after the 
pandemic. In this regard, the donation of data for good and the 
direct and limited (in time and scope) sharing of aggregated data 
by mobile network operators with (democratic) governments and 
researchers seem to be less problematic than the use of individual 
location data commercially acquired, brought together, and analyzed 
by commercial enterprises. More generally, any emergency data sys-
tem set to monitor COVID-19 and beyond must follow a balanced 
and well-articulated set of data policies and guidelines and is sub-
jected to risk assessments.
Specifically, any efforts should meet clear tests on the pro-
portionate, legal, accountable, necessary, and ethical use of mobile 
phone data in the circumstances of the pandemic and seek to mini-
mize the amount of information gathered to what is necessary to 
accomplish the objective concerned. These are not unknown criteria; 
they are well inscribed into international human rights standards 
and law concerning, for example, the use of force. Certainly, the use 
of mobile phone data does not equate to the use of force, but in the 
wrong hands, it can have similarly devastating effects and lead to 
substantially curtail civil liberties. Considering the broad absence of 
legal frameworks and historical mishandling of data by tech-
nology companies, there is an urgent need for responsible global 
leadership and governance to guide efforts to use technology in 
times of emergency.
We further see a clear need for more international exchange, not 
only with other domain experts but also with other initiatives and 
groups; findings must be shared quickly—there will be time for 
peer-reviewed publications later. In particular, in countries with 
weaker health (and often also economic) systems, the targeting and 
effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions might make a big 
difference. This also implies the translation of important findings 
from English to other relevant languages.
For later stages of the pandemic, and for the future, stakeholders 
should aim for a minimum level of “preparedness” for immediate 
and rapid action. On country and/or region levels, there will be a need 
of “standing” mixed teams; up-to-date technology, basic agreements, 
and legal prescriptions; and data access, procedures, and protocols 
predefined [also for “appropriate anonymization and aggregation 
protocols”; (46)]. A long-time collaboration between infectious disease 
modelers, epidemiologists, and researchers of mobile network opera-
tor laboratories in France helped jump-start a project on the COVID-19 
pandemic, with the support of public health authorities (50).
Last, in addition to (horizontal) international exchange, we also 
need international approaches that are coordinated by supranational 
bodies. National initiatives might help to a certain extent but will 
not be sufficient in the long run. A global pandemic necessitates 
globally or at least regionally coordinated work. Here, promising 
approaches are emerging: the EU Commission on 23 March 2020 
called upon European mobile network operators to hand over ano-
nymized and aggregated data to the Commission to track virus 
spread and determine priority areas for medical supplies (51), while 
other coordination initiatives are emerging in Africa, Latin America, 
and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. It will be 
important for such initiatives to link up, share knowledge, and 
collaborate. The COVID-19 pandemic will not be over soon, and it 
will not be the last pandemic we face. Privacy-aware and ethically 
acceptable solutions to use mobile phone data should be prepared 
and vetted in advance, and we must raise readiness on national and 
international levels, so we can act rapidly when the crisis hits.
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